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Does an Adverse Judgment in a Personal
Injury Action Bar a Subsequent Wrong-
ful Death Action?
INTRODUCTION
The California wrongful death statute grants the heirs of an alleged
tort victim an original cause of action upon the death of the victim.'
This wrongful death action is not derived from any personal injury
claim brought by the decedent. 2 Instead, the action provides the
beneficiaries with a remedy for the damages resulting from the death
of the decedent.' When a tort victim prevails in a judgment or
settlement of a claim for personal injuries, the heirs of the victim
are still entitled to recover for injuries caused by the subsequent
death of the personal injury plaintiff.4 California courts are divided,
however, on whether the heirs of a tort victim have a right to bring
a wrongful death action after an adverse judgment in the personal
injury suit.5
In order to recover, both personal injury and wrongful death
plaintiffs must prove the defendant is strictly liable or negligent, and
that the conduct of the defendant was the proximate cause of their
injury. 6 If privity exists between the plaintiff-decedent in a personal
injury action and the plaintiff in a subsequent wrongful death action,
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1988).
2. See id. (the action arises upon the death of the decedent and belongs to the heirs).
3. Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 176 Cal. 79, 81, 167 P. 513, 514 (1917).
4. See id. at 79, 167 P. at 513 (after settlement by the personal injury plaintiff, a
subsequent wrongful death claim was allowed).
5. Compare Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922) (prior
recovery in a personal injury action does not bar a subsequent wrongful death action) and
Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1967)
(allowing a subsequent wrongful death action) with Evans v. Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App.
3d 741, 238 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1987) (refusing to allow the subsequent wrongful death action).
6. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS (5th ed. 1984) (hereinafter W. KEETON) § 30 at 164-68 (elements needed to
recover in a personal injury cause of action), § 127 at 946-47 (elements of a wrongful death
action); See also Earley, 176 Cal. at 81, 167 P. at 514. Personal injury damages include
medical expenses, pain and suffering and compensatory damages. Wrongful death damages
compensate injuries sustained by the heirs such as loss of support, society, comfort and
protection. Id.
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the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issues of
negligence, strict liability and proximate cause.7 Collateral estoppel
effectively bars plaintiffs in privity with a decedent who received an
adverse judgment in a personal injury case from recovering for their
own injuries which arose from the death of the personal injury
plaintiff.8 Privity exists between the heirs and the personal injury
plaintiff only if the California wrongful death action is derivative of
the personal injury action.9
Upon the death of the tort victim, the personal injury claim may
be fully adjudicated, settled or otherwise non-actionable.' 0 The extent
to which the status of the personal injury claim affects the right to
bring a wrongful death action reflects the degree of independence of
the wrongful death action." The independence of the California
wrongful death action is clarified by reviewing how the wrongful
death action is affected by the following: (1) A prior adjudication;' 2
(2) settlement by the decedent;' 3 (3) release by the decedent prior to
injury;' 4 (4) the contributory negligence of the decedent; and (5) an
adverse judgment against the decedent.' 6
This comment will outline the doctrine of res judicata and due
process, and explain how these doctrines are balanced to allow
relitigation of issues by persons who are parties to an action or in
privity with the parties. 7 California case law will next be reviewed
to determine whether a wrongful death action is entirely independent
of the personal injury action brought by the victim-decedent.'8 This
comment will then consider whether, under California law, the heirs
7. See W. KEETON, supra note 6, § 30 at 164-67 and § 127 946-47; 7 B.WITKiN,
CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 287 (3d ed. 1985).
8. 7 WrrraN, supra note 7, § 288; Lynch v. Glass, 44 Cal. App. 3d 943, 947, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 139, 141 (1975) (privity means that collateral estoppel applies). A party cannot assert a
prior adjudication against another who is not a party or in privity with a party to prior
adjudication. Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982).
10. See infra notes 119-166 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 119-191 and accompanying text.
12. See Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922).
13. See Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513 (1917); Robinson v.
Leigh, 153 Cal. App. 2d 730, 315 P.2d 42 (1957).
14. See Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 236 Cal. Rptr.
181 (1987).
15. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955).
16. Secrest v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 746, 141 P.2d 747 (1943); Kaiser
Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. 330 (1967); Evans v.
Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App. 3d 741, 238 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1987).
17. See infra notes 21-91 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-191 and accompanying text.
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of an injured decedent are actually in privity with the plaintiff in
the personal injury action.' 9 Finally, this comment will assert that
the heirs of a personal injury plaintiff-decedent have an independent
wrongful death cause of action. 20 Since the heirs can sue in their
own action, the heirs have no legal interest in the personal injury
action of the decedent. Furthermore, since no interest of the heirs is
represented in the personal injury action, no privity relationship exists
with the personal injury plaintiff.
I. THE APPLICATION OF RES JUDICATA PRINCIPLES TO WRONGFUL
DEATH CLAIMS
The doctrine of res judicata has two applications, res judicata and
estoppel by judgment.2' Res judicata precludes parties to the original
action or people in privity with those parties from relitigating causes
of action that were fully adjudicated in the original action. 22 Similarly,
estoppel by judgment precludes relitigation of any issue decided in
an earlier action involving the same parties or their privies, even if
the subsequent claim is based on a different cause of action.
23
Res judicata is comprised of two closely related doctrines: merger
and bar. 24 Merger applies when a plaintiff prevails on a claim, and
bar applies when a claimant loses after full adjudication. 25 When a
claimant receives a favorable judgment, all possible grounds for the
cause of action merge into that judgment. 26 The plaintiff is thereby
precluded from raising those claims in future litigation against the
same defendants. 27 When a claimant loses a lawsuit, the claimant is
19. See infra notes 198-240 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 198-240 and accompanying text.
21. Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank v. Glynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283, 93 Cal. Rptr. 907, 912
(1971).
22. Id.
23. Id.; McGaffey v. Sudowitz, 189 Cal. App. 2d 215, 217, 10 Cal. Rptr. 862, 864 (1961).
The doctrine of res judicata means that when the rights of the parties have been litigated, the
final resultant judgment conclusively establishes the rights of the parties respecting the matters
litigated. Id. See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Daminion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 604, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 559, 560, 375 P.2d 439, 440 (1963) (the requirement of mutuality of estoppel has been
abolished in California).
24. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE Am A. MILLER, CIVn PROCEDURE § 14.1 (1985) (hereinafter
J. FRiEDENTHAL) (merger and bar prohibit claim splitting); 7 W=rN supra note 7, §§ 243,
249.
25. 7 WITKIN, supra note 7, §§ 243, 249.
26. Id. § 243. A second suit can not be filed to recover additional damages because all
claims are merged. Restatement (Second) of Judgments §§ 17, 18 (1982).
27. 7 WrrKIN, supra note 7, §§ 243, 249.
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barred from raising the same cause of action, even if new facts or
legal theories are uncovered that warrant recovery. 28
Estoppel by judgment operates through the application of direct
and collateral estoppel. 29 Direct estoppel precludes an issue from
being relitigated if the prior judgment and the present suit are based
on the same cause of action.30 Similarly, collateral estoppel applies
when a final judgment estops relitigation of an issue in a different
cause of action.3'
The two aspects of res judicata, res judicata and estoppel by
judgment, may be distinguished in three ways. 32 First, res judicata
prevents relitigation of claims, and estoppel by judgment prevents
relitigation of issues. 33 Second, res judicata bars litigation of all issues
that were or could have been litigated prior to the final judgment
on a claim, while estoppel by judgment operates only when an issue
has been fully litigated.3 4 Third, res judicata bars relitigation of the
same cause of action, whereas estoppel by judgment merely bars
relitigation of the same issues in later suits on any cause of action.
Since the causes of action for personal injury and wrongful death
are different, collateral estoppel, not direct estoppel, bars relitigation
of the defendant's liability when the wrongful death plaintiffs were
parties in the personal injury action or are in privity with the decedent
in the personal injury action.3 6
28. Eichman v. Fotomat Corp., 147 Cal. App. 3d 1170, 1174, 197 Cal. Rptr. 612, 614;
7 WrTiI, supra note 7, §§ 249.
29. J. FRiEDENTHAL, supra note 25, § 14.1.
30. Smith v. Smith, 127 Cal. App. 3d 207-08, 179 Cal. Rptr. 492, 494 (1981) See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17 comment c, 20 comment b; 7 WITKiN, supra note
7, § 193. See also J. FRiEDENTHAL, supra note 25, § 14.1 (since subsequent suits are already
decided and are usually extinguished entirely by res judicata, direct estoppel is rarely involved).
31. Lockwood v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 667, 672, 206 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788(1984). See 7 WrrK, supra note 7, § 253 (collateral estoppel is the equivalent of issue
preclusion).
32. J. FRiEDENTHAL, supra note 25, § 14.2.
33. Cromwell v. Sacramento, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876) (discussion on distinction between
res judicata and collateral estoppel); 7 WITKIN, supra note 7, §§ 190, 246, 249, 253.
34. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-53 (A judgment on a claim results in a final determination
of all matters potentially or actually offered and received in the litigation of the claim); 7
WITKIN, supra note 7, § 190; Derish v. San Mateo-Burlingame Bd. of Realtors, 724 F.2d 1347,
1351 (1983).
35. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-53; Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (under collateral estoppel, a determined
issue is final whether raised in the same or a different claim).
36. Comment, Wrongful Death Recoveries: Is the Decedent's Negligence Still a Defense
After Li?, 11 Pac. L.J. 775, 779 (1980). Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 693-
94, 209 P. 999, 1000 (1922); Blake v. Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41 (Q.B. 1852)(interpreting the wrongful death action as a new cause of action even if the right to bring the
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Three general policies exist behind the doctrine of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. First, no person should be burdened with the
expense and annoyance of defending the same claim more than once.3 7
Parties engage in litigation to resolve, not to perpetuate, legal dis-
putes." Therefore, once a final judgment39 is rendered, the prevailing
party should be able to rely on that resolution. ° The appeals process
corrects judicial error; therefore, relitigation of the same issues after
an appeal is pointless. 4'
In addition, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel
conserve judicial resources. 42 The demand for judicial resolution of
controversies far exceeds the capacity of the court system to resolve
controversies. 43 The relitigation of one dispute may result in the delay
of another case. Therefore, preventing the relitigation of claims and
issues enables the court system to resolve conflicts more quickly. 44
Finally, the ability to rely on a final judgment maintains the
integrity of the judicial system. 45 The outcome of a lawsuit may be
altered when a claim or. an issue is relitigated. This inconsistency
serves to weaken the public's faith in the efficiency and fairness of
the judicial system. Thus, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel facilitate reliance on judicial action by reducing the number
of inconsistent decisions.4 6
Section 1908 of the California Code of Civil Procedure provides
that judgment by a court with proper jurisdiction is conclusive
wrongful death action is contingent on whether the decedent could have brought the action);
7 WITKIN, supra note 7, § 193 (designating collateral estoppel as the proper approach for
precluding relitigation of issues in two distioct causes of action).
37. Montana, 440 U. S. at 153-54; DeWeese v. Unick, 102 Cal. App. 3d 100, 105, 162
Cal. Rptr. 259, 261-62 (1980); Gill v. Peppin, 41 Cal. App. 487, 491 (1919) (a person should
not be twice vexed for the same cause); 7 WITKIN, supra note 7, § 188.
38. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; DeWeese, 102 Cal. App. at 105, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 261-
62.
39. See Carney v. Simmonds, 49 Cal. 2d 84, 315 P. 2d 305 (1957) (a judgment is not
final while an appeal is pending on the judgment); Howard v. Howard, 67 Cal. App. 56, 226
P. 984 (1924) (A judgment is final when the time for an appeal has passed and no appeal
was taken).
40. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; DeWeese, 102 Cal. App. 3d. at 105, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
261-62. See Bernard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d
892, 894 (1922) (res judicata keeps a losing party from again drawing an issue into controversy).
41. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
42. Id.; DeWeese, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62.
43. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54; DeWeese, 102 Cal. App. 3d at 105, 162 Cal. Rptr. at
261-62.
44. Montana, 440 U.S. at 153-54.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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between the parties and their successors in interest.4 7 Therefore,
litigation of an issue or claim precludes relitigation of the same issue
or cause of action by parties bringing an action under the same title48
or parties who are bringing the action in the same capacity as parties
who already litigated the issue or claim.4 9 In Bernhard v. Bank of
America National Trust & Savings Association, the California Su-
preme Court identified three requirements for applying collateral
estoppel to preclude relitigation of an issue.51 The issue decided in
the prior adjudication must be identical to the issue presented in the
present action.5 2 Next, the court must determine whether there was
a final judgment on the merits.13 Finally, the party against whom
the plea is asserted in the present action must have been a party, or
in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication.5 4 The determination
of whether a party is in privity with a party to a prior adjudication
often creates problems because of the confusion about the definition
of privity. 51
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRIVITY
Privity is a relationship or connection between a party to an action
and a non-party that binds the actual party to the action. 6 Tradi-
tionally, privity was an interest in the subject matter of litigation
which arose after judgment by inheritance, succession or purchase
from one of the parties.5 7 In Zaragosa v. Craven, 8 the California
47. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1908 (West 1983).
48. For example, if two plaintiffs bring a wrongful death action as heirs, they are asserting
the right to recover under the common title of heir.
49. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1908 (West 1983).
50. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
51. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
52. Id. See Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal. 2d 315, 317, 202 P.2d 73 (1949) (the first
requirement for a valid res judicata plea). In re Estate of Clark, 190 Cal. 354, 360-61, 212 P.
625.
53. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. See Zaragosa, 33 Cal. 2d at 317, 202
P.2d at 74 (1949) (second res judicata requirement).
54. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. See Zaragosa, 33 Cal. 2d at 317, 202
P.2d at 74-75 (third res judicata requirement); Estate of Clark, 190 Cal. at 360-61, 212 P. at
625.
55. Compare Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 330 (1967) (holding that heirs are not in privity with personal injury plaintiffs) with
Evans v. Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App. 3d 741, 238 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1987) (holding that heirs
are in privity with personal injury plaintiffs).
56. 7 WITKIN, supra note 7, § 287.
57. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 811, 122 P.2d at 894 (privity denotes mutual or successive
interests to the same rights or property).
58. 33 Cal. 2d 315, 202 P.2d 73 (1949).
226
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Supreme Court expanded the concept of privity to include a mutual
or successive interest with another in the same legal right. 9 The
Zaragosa court held that privity exists between spouses in a suit by
one spouse for personal injuries.60 In Zaragosa, the husband brought
a personal injury action after both the husband and the wife were
injured in an automobile accident.6 ' The husband, who was driving
when the accident occurred, lost the personal injury action. 62 The
wife in Zaragosa had a legal right to share the judgment proceeds
of the husband-plaintiff. 63 Therefore, the wife was in privity with
the husband and collateral estoppel precluded the wife from reliti-
gating the negligence of the defendant in a separate personal injury
suit. 64
In Cortez v. Los Angeles,65 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied the Zaragosa definition of privity.6 6 The Cortez court held
that a child bringing a personal injury action was not in privity with
the child's parents in an action by the parents to recover the cost of
medical care for the child.67 The court reasoned that a child has a
distinct legal right to recover for personal injuries since the damages
are different than those in the parents' cause of action. While a child
clearly has an economic interest in the outcome of the parental suit,
the child has no legal interest in the outcome of that suit.6 8
In Clemmer v. Hartford Insurance Co. ,69 the California Supreme
Court expanded the privity concept to include relationships that are
"sufficiently close" to justify the application of collateral estoppel. 70
59. Zaragosa, 33 Cal. 2d at 318, 202 P.2d at 75. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Salazar, 155 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 861, 865, 318 P.2d 210, 212 (1957); Margolis v. Superior
Court, 151 Cal. App. 2d 333, 334, 311 P.2d 167, 168 (1957).
60. Zaragosa, 33 Cal.2d at 321, 202 P.2d at 77.
61. Id.
62. Id. The adverse personal injury judgment was due to a jury finding that the defendant
was not negligent or the husband was contributorily negligent. The wife brought an action for
personal injuries. Id. The wife conceded that unless the personal injury would be separate
property, the contributory negligence of her husband would bar her personal injury action.
Id. at 317, 202 P.2d at 74.
63. Id. at 321, 202 P.2d at 77. The court based the decision on California community
property law which deems that money recovered for damages during the marriage is community
property of both spouses. This rule applies to property that was not owned by the spouse
before marriage or acquired afterward by gift, devise, bequest or descent. Id.
64. Id.
65. 96 F.R.D. 427 (1983).
66. Cortz, 96 F.R.D. at 427.
67. Id. at 429.
68. Id.
69. 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285 (1979).
70. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289. See Lynch v.
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The Clemmer court also considered the due process right to be heard
in court before being deprived of life, liberty or property without
just compensation.7 ' Under Clemmer, even if a court is justified in
applying collateral estoppel in light of public policy interests, the due
process rights of the claimant must be satisfied before parties will
be considered in privity.72
III. DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS AS A GUIDELINE
IN DEFINING PRIITY
Before applying collateral estoppel, due process requires that the
person to be estopped have an "identity or community of interest
with the party to the first action. ' 73 Additionally, the person must
have been adequately represented by the party in the prior action./' 4
Finally, due process requires that the person should reasonably expect
to be bound by the prior adjudication.7 5
Glass, 44 Cal. App. 3d 943, 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. 139, 142 (1975). See also People v. One 1964
Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720, 731, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447, 454 (1969) (the
emphasis in determining whether a relationship is "sufficiently close" to apply the principles
of preclusion, is on the policy of ending litigation, where there has been a fair trial of the
claimant's interests); People ex rel. State of Calif. v. Drinkhouse, 4 Cal. App. 3d 931, 937,
84 Cal. Rptr. 773, 776 (1970) (also using the sufficiently close standard to define privity).
71. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289. See Lynch, 44
Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 142. See also Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 172
A. 260 (Del. 1934) (due process mandates that no person be deprived of personal property
rights by a judgment with out notice and an opportunity to be heard); U.S. CONST. amend.
V, XIV § 1 (before deprivation of life, liberty or property all people have the right to be
heard in a court of law).
72. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90; Blonder-
Tongue v. Uhiversity Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971); Dillard v. McKnight, 34 Cal. 2d 209,
214-15, 209 P.2d 387 (1949); Bernard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 122 P.2d
892 (1942). See Lynch, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
73. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90. See
Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329; Dillard, 34 Cal. 2d 209, 214-15, 209 P.2d 387; Bernard, 19
Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892; Lynch, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
74. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90. Blonder-
Tongue, 402 U.S. at 329; Dillard, 34 Cal. 2d at 214-15, 209 P.2d at 393; Bernard, 19 Cal. 2d
807, 122 P.2d 892; Lynch, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 142.
75. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (citing Lynch,
44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. 139 at 142). This expectation would be present where
the non-party had a proprietary or financial interest, in and control of, a prior action, or
where the unsuccessful party in the first action acted in a representative capacity for a non-
party. Lynch 44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 142. In Lynch the plaintiffs had an
identity in interest with the plaintiffs in the prior action, and were aware of the prior litigation.
However, the plaintiffs had no control over the earlier case, and did not stand in any
relationship with the prior plaintiffs that would put them on reasonable notice of the binding
effect of litigation. Id. at 949, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
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The California Supreme Court in Clemmer utilized a due process
analysis and did not find privity.76 The defendant in Clemmer, an
insurance company, insured a doctor under a personal comprehensive
policy. 77 The doctor killed a co-worker and was convicted of second
degree murder. 78 The doctor withdrew his insanity plea prior to the
rendering of the verdict, which precluded a conclusion that the act
was not willful. 79 The family of the victim brought a successful
wrongful death action against the doctor and a subsequent action
against the insurance company to satisfy the judgment. 80 The insur-
ance company argued that the policy excluded willful acts of the
insured.8' The insurance company claimed that since the issue of
willfulness had been determined in the criminal proceedings by virtue
of the second degree murder conviction, collateral estoppel barred
the plaintiffs from relitigating the issue of willfulness.8 2 The Clemmer
court held that the insurance company and the doctor were not in
privity and thus the plaintiffs were not collaterally estopped from
litigating the issue of willfulness.8" The court reasoned that the
doctor's withdrawal of his insanity plea was contrary to the interests
of the plaintiff in establishing an unintentional act.8 4 The decision
not to litigate the issue of willfulness demonstrates that the doctor
had interests different from those of the plaintiffs.85 Since the interests
of the parties were distinct, no privity existed. 6
A court must review all the circumstances of a case before deter-
mining whether the due process rights of an individual have been
fully protected. 7 The importance of protecting the rights of a party
seeking to litigate an issue varies depending upon the substantive
right at issue. If the right being asserted was adequately represented
in a previous action, then the importance of reasserting that right
76. Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875-76, 587 P.2d 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. 289-90.
77. Id. at 872, 587 P.2d at 1100, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
78. Id. The defendant killed the co-worker by shooting him three times. The shooting





82. Id. at 877, 587 P.2d at 1103, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
83. Id. at 877, 587 P.2d at 1103-04, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 290-91.
84. Id. at 877, 587 P.2d at 1103, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 290.
85. Id. The court noted that the doctor's decision to withdraw the insanity plea might
have been motivated by a desire to go to jail rather than to the state mental hospital. Id.
86. Id. at 874, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289.
87. Id. at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90.
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decreases. 8 Thus, due process requires that before a wrongful death
plaintiff can be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues deter-
mined in a prior personal injury action, the rights of the wrongful
death plaintiff must have been adequately represented in the personal
injury action.89 The right of a wrongful death plaintiff can only be
represented by the personal injury plaintiff if the wrongful death
action is derivative of the personal injury actionP ° Due process
requires that when the wrongful death cause of action is independent
of the personal injury action, the wrongful death plaintiff must have
an opportunity to litigate the rights granted to that plaintiff.9'
IV. WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES
The wrongful death action is a statutorily created cause of action.9 2
State statutes vary in the degree of independence granted to the heirs'
cause of action. 93 In states where a wrongful death action is derivative
of the personal injury action, the right to bring the action is contin-
gent upon whether the decedent, if alive, would have the right to
bring a personal injury claim against the same defendant.9 4 A full
adjudication 95 or out-of-court settlement of the personal injury claim
extinguishes the derivative right of the heirs since, the personal injury
plaintiff will no longer have a valid claim against the defendant.
9 6
88. See 7 WITKIN, supra note 7, § 289.
89. See Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (requiring
a consideration of due process rights in determining whether collateral estoppel applies);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 (1982) (discussing when issue preclusion bars a
wrongful death action following a personal injury action).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment b (1982).
91. Id. If the wrongful death action is wholly independent, the beneficiaries would have
a separate interest in the decedent's life. Id. See Lynch, 44 Cal. App. 3d at 948, 119 Cal.
Rptr. at 142. (due process must be satisfied before privity attaches); 7 WITEIN, supra note 7,
§ 289 (the underlying theme is that the interest represented in the second action was represented
in the first action).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment a (1982) (common law of
the 18th and early 19th centuries did not recognize any cause of action for the death of a tort
victim).
93. See id. reporter's note. (discussion of approaches taken by different states).
94. Id. comment b (1982); See Mason v. Gerin Corp., 231 Kan. 718, 647 P.2d 1340
(1982) (requiring that a right of action exist in the decedent at the time of death as a condition
precedent to the existence of a right to bring a wrongful death action).
95. See Perkins v. Variety Children's Hosp., 445 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 1983) (a judgment
for personal injuries bars a subsequent wrongful death action).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982). If the wrongful death
action is derivative, the injured person and the wrongful death plaintiffs are successively
eligible representatives. Id. Thus, the heirs in a jurisdiction with a derivative wrongful death
statute are successive in interest and thus, satisfy even the traditional, conservative definition
of privity. J. FREIDENTHAL, supra note 25 at 684.
230
1988 / Adverse Judgement in Personal Injury Action
Thus, a defense which would be effective against the decedent due
to the prior settlement or adjudication is equally effective in barring
the wrongful death claim of the heirs of the decedent. 97 A different
result is reached in those states where wrongful death statutes provide
an independent claim to the beneficiaries. In these states, the dis-
position of the personal injury claim, by settlement or adjudication,
has no effect on the later wrongful death action. 98
Although several states have adopted wrongful death statutes that
provide for an independent cause of action in favor of the heirs of
the decedent, considerable variation exists in the degree of independ-
ence attributed to the personal injury and wrongful death claims. 99
In most independent wrongful death statute jurisdictions, the wrong-
ful death claim is independent to the extent that recovery by the
decedent does not preclude recovery by the heirs for their separate
injuries.'00 The decedent, however, is treated as a representative of
the heirs in determining the liability of the alleged tortfeasor.' 0' The
decedent's role as representative creates a privity relationship between
the decedent and the heirs. 02 Thus, in these jurisdictions, after a
judgment against the personal injury plaintiff, the defendant may
collaterally estop the heirs from relitigating the issue of liability.'03
In a few states, including California, a wrongful death action is
completely unaffected by the personal injury action of the decedent. °4
Under this view, the legal interests of the wrongful death heirs are
entirely distinct from those interests represented in the personal injury
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982).
98. Id. See id. § 46 comments b, c (1982); Alfone v. Sarno, 87 N.J. 99, 103-04, 110, 432
A.2d 857, 864-65, 872 (1981) (damages for personal injury to the decedent cannot be recovered
in the wrongful death action; however, the heirs may recover for losses caused by the death
of the decedent). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982)
(wrongful death plaintiffs have a legal interest in the life of the victim that is separate from
the legal interest of the victim).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982).
100. See id. (double recovery is not allowed).
101. Id. See Alfone, 87 N.J. at 99, 432 A.2d at 857 (exemplifing the view that personal
injury plaintiffs and wrongful death plaintiffs have identical interests).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982); Alfone, 87 N.J. at
101, 432 A.2d at 859.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982). Res judicata precludes
the heirs of the decedent from relitigating essential issues of liability already determined and
bars litigation of issues that decedent failed to raise. Alfone, 87 N.J. at 101, 432 A.2d at 859.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982); Alfone, 87 N.J. at 99,
432 A.2d at 857. See De Hart v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 84 Ohio App. 62, 85 N.E. 2d 586 (1948)
(supporting the proposition that death action beneficiaries can sue after the decedent lost the
personal injury action); Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62
Cal. Rptr. 330 (1967) (decision allowing wrongful death action after a previous personal injury
action).
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action brought by the decedent and, therefore, no privity exists. 0 -
The heirs cannot be collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue
of liability after the decedent litigates the personal injury action. 06
Even an adverse judgment in the personal injury action does not bar
the wrongful death action. 10 7
V. THE CALIFORNIA WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
A. Historical Development
The wrongful death cause of action originated from an English
statute known as the Lord Campbell Act.'0 The right to bring a
wrongful death action under the act depended upon whether the
decedent would have had the right to bring a personal injury claim
against the defendant if the decedent had survived.' t 9 At early com-
mon law, the heirs could not bring a wrongful death action if the
decedent settled or fully adjudicated a claim, regardless of the re-
sult." 0 In 1862, the California legislature passed a wrongful death
statute patterned after the Lord Campbell Act."' California repealed
this statute and enacted California Code of Civil Procedure section
377.112
California Code of Civil Procedure section 377 allows the heirs of
a decedent to sue a defendant for wrongful death."13 California courts
interpret section 377 to provide an original cause of action for
105. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c; Alfone, 87 N.J. at 99, 432
A.2d at 857. See DeHart, 84 Ohio App. at 62, 85 N.E.2d at 586 (the rights of the heirs begin
where those of the injured person end and are rights over which the injured person has no
control).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982).
107. Id.
108. Fatal Accidents Act of 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93, at 531-32. See Comment, supra
note 37, at 779 (the statute was called the Fatal Accidents Act). The statute did not create an
exception to the common law rule that tort claims died with the person. Id. See also Blake v.
Midland Ry., 118 Eng. Rep. 35, 41 (Q.B. 1852) (The Act does not transfer the right of'
decedent's cause of action to his representatives, but gives representatives a totally new cause
of action based on different principles)..
109. Fatal Accidents Act of 1946, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93 at 531-32. See Comment, supra
note 37, at 779.
110. See Comment, supra note 37, at 779.
111. 1862 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, sec. 1, at 447. See Comment, supra note 37, at 780.
112. See Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 197, 288 P.2d 12, 20 (1955) (providing the
history of the enactment of Civil Procedure section 377).
113. Id.
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wrongful death." 4 The damages recoverable by the heirs may redress
expenses and suffering" 5 resulting from the death of the decedent . 6
The wrongful death cause of action is independent of the personal
injury action." 7 Yet, the California Supreme Court declined to de-
termine whether an adverse personal injury judgment precludes the
heirs from bringing the wrongful death action." 8
B. The Independence of the California Wrongful Death Action
The independent right of the heirs to bring an action for wrongful
death can be illustrated by examining the right to bring a wrongful
death action after settlement, prior successful adjudication, or release
prior to injury by the personal injury plaintiff." 9 Some California
case law refers to the wrongful death action as completely independ-
ent of the personal injury cause of action. 20 For example, in Earley
v. Pacific Electric Railway Co.,12t the California Supreme Court held
that the settlement of a personal injury suit by the decedent does
not bar the heirs of the decedent from bringing a wrongful death
action.'22 In Earley, the plaintiff sued for the wrongful death of her
husband who was injured while a passenger on the defendant's
railroad car.2 3 Prior to his death, the husband released the defendant
from future liability in consideration for the defendant's payment of
the hospital bill and $5200 in cash. 24 The Earley court stated that
114. See Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513 (1917); Blackwell v. American
Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922) (holding that the wrongful death action is
independent).
115. Earley, 176 Cal. at 81, 167 P. at 514 (suffering includes deprivation of support,
society, comfort and protection).
116. Early, 176 Cal. at 79, 167 P. at 513. See Curry v. Fred Olson Line, 367 F.2d 921
(1966); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981); Kaiser
Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. 330; Garcia v. State,
247 Cal. 2d 814, 56 Cal. Rptr. 80 (1967); CAL. CIr. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1988) (a
wrongful death action is not a continuation or a derivative of the personal injury cause of
action of th decedent but is an original distrinct cause of action in the heirs of the decedent).
117. Blackwell, 189 Cal. at 689, 209 P. at 999. See Pacific Employ. Ins. Co. v. Hartford
Steam Boiler Inspect. & Ins. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 646, 299 P.2d 928 (1956) (appling worker's
compensation law to a wrongful death action under the labor code).
118. See Kaiser, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. ,at 339; Evans v. Celotex Corp.,
194 Cal. App. 741, 28 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1987).
119. See infra notes 126-174 & accompanying text.
120. See Earlev, 176 Cal. at 79, 167 P. at 513; Blackwell, 189 Cal. at 689, 209 P at 999.
121. 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513 (1917).
122. Earley, 176 Cal. at 82, 167 P. at 514.
123. Id. at 80, 167 P. at 513.
124. Id. The written contract between the decedent and the defendant released "the Pacific
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the right to bring a wrongful death action is completely independent
of the decedent's right to recover for an injury. 25 The fact that the
two claims arose from the same tort has no bearing on the inde-
pendence of those claims. 26 According to the court, a settlement by
the decedent releasing the defendants from further liability does not
absolve the defendant of liability in the wrongful death action brought
by the heirs. 27.
Similarly, in Blackwell v. American Film Co., 28 the California
Supreme Court held that although the decedent recovered for injuries
prior to his death, the heirs of the decedent would not be precluded
from bringing a wrongful death action against the same defendant. 129
In Blackwell, the plaintiff brought an action for the wrongful death
of her husband. 30 Prior to the wrongful death action, the plaintiff,
as administratrix of the estate, represented the husband in the per-
sonal injury action initiated by the decedent before his death.' 3 ' The
court held that recovery of damages for personal injury by the
decedent does not prevent a recovery in a subsequent wrongful death
action. 3 2 The court relied on the holding in Earley, and on section
377 which creates a new cause of action. 33 The Blackwell court stated
that the California wrongful death statute provides the heirs with an
independent right to compensation for damages sustained due to the
death of the decedent despite a successful judgment for the decedent's
estate. 114
In Coates v. Newhall Land and Farming, Inc.,'35 the California
Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District held that when a
decedent releases a defendant from liability prior to the occurrence
of an injury, the heirs are not entitled to bring a wrongful death
Electric Railway Company from any and all claims and causes of action on account of any
and all personal injuries . . . suffered by me ... and due to the collision of a car upon
which I was a passenger." Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. See Robinson v. Leigh, 153 Cal. App. 2d 730, 733, 315 P.2d 40, 44-45 (1957)
(allowing the wrongful death action after settlement by the personal injury plaintiff).
128. 189 Cal. 689, 209 P. 999 (1922).
129. Blackwell; 189 Cal. at 693-94, 209 P. at 1001.
130. Id. at 692, 209 P. at 1000.
131. Id. at 693, 209 P. at 1001.
132. Id. at 693-94, 209 P. at 1001.
133. Earley v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 81, 167 P. 513, 513-14 (1917) (damages
in wrongful death generally include compensation for deprivation of society, comfort and
protection).
134. Blackwell, 189 Cal. at 694, 209 P. at 1001.
135. 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 (1987).
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action against that defendant. 3 6 In Coates the decedent was killed in
a dirt bike accident in the defendant's park. Before the injury, the
decedent signed a contract which expressly waived liability for any
future injuries or death which might result from the ordinary negli-
gence of the park owner. 37 Additionally, the decedent assumed all
risk of injury from dangers inherent in dirt bike riding on the premises
of the defendants.' 38 The heirs of the decedent brought an action for
wrongful death against the defendant-land owner.13 9 The court dis-
tinguished Coates from Earley because in Coates the release was
signed before the accident, while in Earley the release was not signed
until after the injuries had occurred. 4° When an advance waiver of
liability is given, a potential plaintiff expressly waives all claims
against a particular, potential tortfeasor. ' 4 ' Furthermore, by an ex-
press assumption of the risk, the potential plaintiff eliminates the
duty of care owed by the potential defendant by personally assuming
the duty of care. 42 The Coates court held that by removing this duty
of care, the contract signed by the decedent effectively authorized
the negligent behavior of the defendant-landowner. 4a The court con-
cluded that this authorized behavior was not wrongful, and therefore,
failed to provide the basis for a wrongful death action.'" The court
in Coates further stressed that an express assumption of the risk by
a plaintiff is actually more effective in authorizing the tortious
behavior of a defendant than a contractual waiver of the potential
remedy. 41 Unlike an express assumption of the risk, an express waiver
of liability does not transfer the potential defendant's duty. 146 Instead,
when a decedent expressly releases the potential defendant from
liability, the potential defendant still owes a general duty, and the
heirs are unaffected by a decedent's release. 47 Therefore, the court
136. Coates, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 1, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 181.






143. Id. at 8, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 184. The recreational park/dirtbike rider contract is a
private, voluntary transaction and does not violate public policy. Id. See Tunkl v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 101, 383 P.2d 441, 446-47, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 36-38 (1963)
(providing guidelines for determining whether a contract releasing a person from future liability
violates public policy).
144. Coates, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 7, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
147. Id. at 7 n.3, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.3. The Earley rule applies to contractual release
of liability not to contractual assumption of the risk before injury. Id.
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noted that if the contract contained a release, but did not provide
for an express assumption of risk, the wrongful death action would
have survived. 48
In Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Association,'4 9
the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District held
that the inability of the decedent to recover in a personal injury
action did not bar his heirs from bringing a wrongful death action.,'"
In Rovegno, the nineteen-year-old decedent drowned in a swimming
pool at a private club.'' The mother of the decedent brought a
wrongful death action against the club based on negligence in failing
to provide a pool lifeguard.1 2 The defendants claimed that assump-
tion of the risk by the decedent barred the mother from bringing an
action. 53 The Rovegno court held that the right of the mother to
bring a wrongful death action is independent of the ability of the
decedent to recover in a personal injury action.- 4 Although the
decedent would probably have been unsuccessful in bringing a per-
sonal injury action had he lived, the court refused to consider
assumption of the risk by the decedent as a defense in the wrongful
death action. 5
The Coates and Rovegno cases can be reconciled by distinguishing
between express and implied assumption of the risk.'56 In Coates,
the heirs have no cause of action because the decedent expressly
assumed the duty of the potential defendant, not because the cause
of action is dependent on the decedent. 5 7 Rovegno, however, illus-
trates that unless the decedent expressly assumed all responsibility,
148. Id. (Earley applies only to true contractual releases of liability and not to contractual
assumption of risk before injury). See generally Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79,
167 P. 513 (1917) (contractual releases by an injured decedent do not a bar a wrongful death
action).
149. 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 P. 848 (1930).
150. Rovegno, 108 Cal. App. at 598, 291 P. at 850-51.
151. Id. at 593, 291 P. at 849.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 594, 291 P. at 849. The assumption of the risk argument was based on the
fact that the club notified the members by mail that swimming in the pool was only allowed
at the risk of the bather. Id. In addition, the club posted a sign near the pool, stating "bathers
use pool at their own risk." Id. Therefore, the decedent impliedly assumed the risk by virtue
of being a member of the club and using the pool. Id. See Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming,
Inc., 191 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7 n.3, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181 n.3.
154. Rovegno, 108 Cal. App. at 598, 291 P. at 850.
155. Id.
156. Coates, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 7 n.3, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 184 n.3 (citing Rovegno, 108
Cal. App. at 591, 291 P. at 848) (even though the defense might have been available against
the decedent the defense may not operate to defeat the independent statutory right of the
mother).
157. Id.
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thereby absolving the potential defendant of a duty, the heirs of that
decedent may pursue a wrongful death action. 58 This right survives
the inability of the decedent to prevail in a personal injury action
because of implied assumption of the risk.15 9
The California wrongful death statute grants the heirs the right to
bring a wrongful death action regardless of whether the decedent, if
alive, could bring a personal injury cause of action. 16° The California
Supreme Court stated that the wrongful death action is a completely
independent cause of action.' 61 Therefore, a prior judgment for or a
settlement by the personal injury plaintiff does not affect the wrong-
ful death action.162 In addition, neither an implied assumption of the
risk or a prior express waiver of liability by the decedent affects the
wrongful death action. 63 Finally, an express assumption of the risk
precludes a potential defendant's actions from being wrongful by
removing a duty of care.'6 Thus, the fact that a wrongful death
action may not be brought after an express assumption of the risk
does not indicate that the wrongful death action is independent.
65
Furthermore, the wrongful death action is still independent because
an express release of liability prior to the injury is not enough to
affect the heirs' action.'6
C. The Effect of Comparative Negligence on a Wrongful Death
Claim
In Buckley v. Chadwick,'67 the California Supreme Court held that
if a decedent was found to be contributorily negligent, the heirs of
158. Id.
159. Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Hall Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 598, 291
P. 848, 850-51 (1930).
160. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1988).
161. Earley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 176 Cal. 79, 80, 167 P. 513, 513 (1917).
162. See Early, 176 Cal. at 80, 167 P. at 513 (wrongful death action allowed after settlement
of the personal injury claim); Blackwell v. American Film Co., 189 Cal. 689, 693, 209 P. 999,
1001 (1922) (wrongful death action allowed after recovery in the personal injury action).
163. See Earle v 176 Cal. at 80, 167 P. at 513 (contractual release by the decedent does
not affect the personal injury claim); Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 191 Cal. App.
3d 1, 8, 236 Cal. Rptr. 181, 184 (prior contractual release by the decedent alone is not enough
to bar wrongful death action). Rovegno, 108 Cal. App. at 593, 291 P. at 849 (implied
assumption of the risk by the decedent does not bar the wrongful death action).
164. Coates, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 7, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 184.
165. Id.
166. Earle), 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513; Coates, 191 Cal. App. 3d at 8, 236 Cal. Rptr. at
184.
167. 45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1945).
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that decedent would be barred from bringing a wrongful death action
against the defendant. 61 In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 169 the law of
contributory negligence was overruled and replaced by comparative
negligence. 70 The overruling of contributory negligence in California
abrogates the Buckley holding. 71 Since Li, the heirs of a tort victim
have a cause of action despite the negligence of the decedent.172
However, the recoverable damages of these heirs decline in proportion
to the negligence of the decedent. 73 This reduction in the wrongful
death recovery reflects the Li policy of assigning the defendant's
liability in accordance with the defendant's fault. 174 Thus, the reduc-
tion in a defendant's liability to the wrongful death plaintiffs ex-
emplifies Li policies, not the interdependence between the personal
injury and wrongful death actions.
Since Li, the Buckley holding, imputing the negligence of the
decedent to the heirs, remains as an obstacle for wrongful death
plaintiffs. 75 The decedent's negligence no longer bars the wrongful
death claim but is instead imputed to assess damages recoverable by
the heirs. 76 The Buckley rule imputing the decedent's negligence to
the heirs has been used to argue that the wrongful death action is
dependent on the personal injury action. 7
The Buckley opinion was questionable when written and under
current law should no longer be controlling.178 The Buckley decision
followed English common law which arose under the Lord Campbell
Act and the common law of California interpreting the original Lord
Campbell-like statute. 79 However, Buckley overlooked the signifi-
cance of the enactment of the new wrongful death statute in 1872
which deleted the requirement that the decedent, if alive, could have
brought an action. 80
168. Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 201, 288 P.2d at 22.
169. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
170. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 804, 532 P.2d at 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
171. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 37, at 775 (discussing the implications of LI).
172. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 804, 532 P.2d at 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
173. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1251, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
174. Id.
175. See generally id. at 804, 532 P.2d at 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 858 (overruling
contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence).
176. Id. at 810-11, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
177. See Evans v. Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App. 741, 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. 259, 261 (1987)
(citing Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d at 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955)).
178. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
179. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d 183, 199, 288 P.2d 12, 21 (1955). The court found
the rule of contributory negligence progenerate. It stated the holding should follow precedent
regardless of whether or not the common law ruling was sound in law and reason. Id.
180. Id. at 197, 288 P.2d at 20.
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The Buckley court stated that a specific legislative amendment was
required to overcome the rule imputing the negligence of the decedent
to the heirs.' 8 ' However, the imputation of negligence was implied
from statutory language designating the wrongful death plaintiffs as
successors to the personal injury action. 82 The independent wrongful
death statute removed the language implying that the rights and
liabilities of the decedent should be imputed to the heirs.'83 Therefore,
the Buckley court should have overruled common law as dictated by
the enactment of the new wrongful death statute. 8 4
Although Buckley has not been officially overruled, the current
trend in some states, including California, is to move away from the
imputation of the decedent's negligence.' 85 For example, in the anal-
ogous situation of a spouse's claim for loss of consortium, some
jurisdictions, including California, reject the imputation of the neg-
ligence of the injured spouse to the plaintiff.' 86 In Lantis v. Condon,8 7
181. Id. at 201, 288 P.2d at 22. The perceived need for legislative rather than judicial
action stemmed from the pervasiveness of the rule that contributory negligence bars the
wrongful death action. Id. at 199, 288 P.2d at 21.
182. Id. at 204, 288 P.2d at 24 (Carter, J., dissenting). The first California wrongful death
statute logically called for imputing the negligence to the heirs, yet the legislature repealed the
derivative elements which required imputation of negligence. Under the original California
statute, the heirs inherited the right of action from the decedent and had only rights which
the decedent would have in the personal injury action. Id. at 197, 288 P.2d at 20. Consequently,
the heirs inherited the negligence of the decedent and the statute implied that the decedent's
contributory negligence barred the claim. Id. at 198, 288 P.2d at 20.
183. V. SCHWARTZ, COmPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 13.3 (2d ed. 1986) (no basis for imputing
negligence of the decedent to the heirs). See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THt LAW OF TORTS §
24.4 at 1289-90 (1956); Wettach, Wrongful Death and Contributory Negligence, 16 N.C.L.
REv. 211 (1938) (arguing that the wrongful death statute creates a separate and independent
cause of action for the heirs and that the negligence of the decedent is irrelevant to the
wrongful death action). See also CAL. Cirv. PROC. CODE § 377 (West Supp. 1988) (The statute
precludes imputation of negligence because the action belongs only to the heirs and arises on
the death of the ancestor).
184. Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 183, 288 at P.2d 12.
185. V. SCHWARTz, supra note 183 § 13.3 n.22. See 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA
LAW (8th ed. 1974) § 711 (negligence will be imputed only where the plaintiff would have
been liable for the negligence of that person), § 713 (relationships of parent and child or
husband and wife in themselves furnish no basis for imputation of contributory negligence).
See also Harpst v. Kirkpatrick, 26 Cal. App. 3d 482, 486, 102 Cal. Rptr. 621, 624 (1972)
(existence of a family relationship was insufficient to establish agency for the imputation of
negligence); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 487, 488 (1965), W. KEETON supra note 6, §
30.
186. Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22, 25-26 (1975). V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 191, § 13.3; In Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 822, 532 P.2d at
1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871, the California Supreme Court summarized two fundamental
precepts of Civil Code section 1714. The first is that one whose negligence has caused damage
to another should be liable therefor. The second is that one whose negligence has contributed
to his own injury should not be permitted to cast the burden of liability on another. Li, 13
Cal. 3d at 822, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871. A holding that a wife's damages for
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for example, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate
District refused to impute the negligence of the husband to reduce
the damages in the loss of consortium action brought by the wife.'88
The court reasoned that the rule of imputed negligence had been
abolished in California.8 9 This trend away from imputation may lead
to a reconsideration of the rule in wrongful death cases especially
since California has adopted comparative fault. 90 Since the overruling
of contributory negligence and the trend towards abolishing the
imputation of negligence, Buckley is not controlling law. 191
VI. Ti RIGHT TO BRING A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION AFTER AN
ADVERSE PERSONAL INJURY JUDGMENT
The controversy in California regarding the right of an heir to
bring a wrongful death action following an adverse personal injury
judgment arose in Secrest v. Pacific Electric Railway Co. 92 In Secrest,
the California Court of Appeals for the Second Appellate District
held that where a decedent and his wife received an adverse judgment
in their personal injuries claim against the defendant, the wife of the
decedent was barred from relitigating the identical issues in a wrong-
ful death claimagainst the same defendant. 93 The court limited the
holding to situations where the wrongful death plaintiff was also a
party in the unsuccessful personal injury action. Since both claims
loss of consortium are reduced in proportion to the husband's contributory negligence violates
these principles. Lantis, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 26. See Fuller v.
Buthrow, 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980) (refusing to impute negligence of injured spouse to the
plaintiff in a loss of consortium case).
187. 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975).
188. Lands, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 159, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 23, 25 (criticizing Buckley and
questioning its life expectancy given the trend in California law).
189. Lantis, 95 Cal. App. 3d at 156, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 23. The court rejects the contention
that Civil Code section 5112 does not prevent the imputation of negligence to reduce damages
only. Id. at 155. The purpose of section 5112 is to abolish the antiquated notion of imputed
negligence.
190. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 183, § 13.3 n.22. See Willis v. Gordon, 20 Cal. 3d 629,
636, 574 P.2d 794, 798, 143 Cal. Rptr. 723, 727 (1978) (Mosk, J., concurring); Nourse, Is
Contributory Negligence of Deceased a Defense to a Wrongful Death Action?, 42 Calif. L.
Rev. 310, 313 (1954) (recommending reconsideration of imputation of contributory negligence
in California wrongful death actions).
191. See Willis, 20 Cal. 3d at 636-38, 574 P.2d at 798-800, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 727-29 (Mosk,
J., concurring); Buckley, 45 Cal. 2d at 206, 288 P.2d at 25-26 (Carter, J., dissenting); Nourse,
supra note 198, at 313 (questioning the logic of imputing the personal injury plaintiff's
negligence to the heirs).
192. 60 Cal. App. 2d 746, 141 P.2d 747 (1943).
193. Secrest, 60 Cal. App. 2d at 751, 141 P.2d at 750.
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involved the same issues, the wrongful death plaintiff was collaterally
estopped from relitigating the issue of negligence.194
The Secrest holding has no bearing on the independent status of
the wrongful death action. 95 The court barred the wrongful death
action because the plaintiff was a party to the previous action, not
because she was in privity with a party to that earlier action. 96
Regardless of whether the wrongful death action is completely in-
dependent, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of issues resolved in
a personal injury action by people who were parties to the personal
injury action. 97 In Kaiser Foundation Hospitals v. Superior Court,98
the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District
decided whether collateral estoppel bars wrongful death actions brought
by plaintiffs who were not parties to the personal injury action. 99
The Kaiser court reasserted the position that a wrongful death action
is a wholly independent cause of action. 200 In Kaiser, a husband and
wife brought an unsuccessful personal injury action against a hospital
for negligent medical treatment. 201 After the wife died, her husband
and daughter brought a wrongful death action against Kaiser Foun-
dation Hospital.202 The court allowed the defendant to collaterally
estop the husband's claim since the husband had been a party to the
prior action 301 A motion to collaterally estop the action by the
daughter failed however, since the daughter was not a party, or in
privity with a party, to the personal injury action. 204 On appeal, the
court of appeals held that the daughter, as a wrongful death plaintiff,
194. Id.
195. Id. at 748, 141 P.2d at 748. The right to bring a wrongful death action is wholly
independent of the right of the decedent to bring an action and is no less independent because
the action originated in the same tort. Id.
196. Id. at 747, 141 P.3d at 749-50.
197. Beverly Hills Nat'l Bank v. Glynn, 16 Cal. App. 3d 274, 283, 93 Cal. Rptr. 907, 912
(1971). If the wrongful death plaintiff is a party to the personal injury action, privity is not
an issue in applying collateral estoppel. Id. The independence of the wrongful death action is
only relevant in determining whether the people are in privity. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 46 comment c (1982).
198. 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. 339 (1967).
199. Kaiser, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 62 Cal. Rptr. 330.
200. Id. at 333, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 333. See Secrest v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 60 Cal. App.
2d 746, 748, 141 P.2d 747, 748 (1943) (asserting the independence of the California wrongful
death statute).
201. Kaiser, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 330. 62 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
202. Id. (the jury rendered a judgment in favor of defendants and the judgment became
final).
203. Id. (the husband was a party to the personal injury action and thus, in the same
position as the wife in Secrest).
204. Compare id. (plaintiff was not a party in the personal injury action) with Secrest, 60
Cal. App. 2d at 746, 141 P.2d at 717 (where plaintiff was a party to the personal action).
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lacked privity with the personal injury plaintiff.25 The court reasoned
that the wrongful death action is not derivative of the cause of action
brought by the decedent. 206 Instead, the wrongful death action is a
separate and distinct cause of action which may be brought by the
plaintiff.207 Under the facts of Kaiser, no legal identity in interest
existed, thus, no privity existed between the personal injury plaintiff
and the wrongful death plaintiff. 20 8 Although the daughter, as a
future heir and dependent of her mother, had a strong financial
interest in the outcome of the personal injury suit,209 no identity of
interest existed.210 The due process right of the daughter to have her
day in court before losing her personal or property rights prevailed
because the right was not represented by the personal injury plain-
tiff.211
In 1987, the California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate
District reached a decision which sharply conflicts with the holding
in Kaiser.2 2 In Evans v. Celotex Corp. ,213 the wife and daughter of
a deceased tort victim brought a wrongful death action. 214 Prior to
his death, the decedent brought an unsuccessful personal injury claim
against the defendant. 215 In the subsequent wrongful death action
brought by the decedent's family, the trial court collaterally estopped
the claim because of the adverse judgment in the prior personal
injury action. 21 6 On appeal, this grant of collateral estoppel was
affirmed.21 7 The Evans court applied the rule from Secrest that a
prior adverse judgment in a personal injury action bars a subsequent
wrongful death action through the application of collateral estop-
pel. 218 The Evans court, however, failed to adopt the important
distinction required by Secrest that the wrongful death plaintiff be a
party to the losing personal injury action. 21 9 Since the wrongful death
205. Kaiser, 254 Cal. App. 2d at 333, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (nor was the action a continuation or revival of the personal injury action).
209. Id. (the interest arose by virtue of being an heir).
210.- Id. (identity of interest is a legal interest).
211. Id.
212. See Evans v. Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App. 3d 741, 747 238 Cal. Rptr. 259, 262
(1987) (declining to follow Kaiser).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
215. Id.
216. Id. (none of the wrongful death plaintiffs were parties in the personal injury action
brought by the decedent).
217. Id.
218. Id. at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
219. Id.
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plaintiff in Secrest was a party to the previous action, the doctrine
of collateral estoppel was invoked. 220 However, the Secrest court
never addressed the issue of whether privity existed between wrongful
death and personal injury plaintiffs. 22' Therefore, the Evans court
was misguided in relying on Secrest as authority for a finding of
privity between a personal injury plaintiff and a wrongful death
plaintiff who was not a party to the personal injury action. 222
The Evans court then addressed the issue of whether privity existed
between the personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs. 223 The
court did not follow the traditional notion of privity, which requires
that a legal interest of a non-party be represented in an action. 224
The Evans court instead applied the modern definition of privity
which requires that the parties to the two actions be sufficiently close
to justify invoking collateral estoppel when considering the due
process rights of the claimant. 225
The Evans court concluded that the interests of the wrongful death
plaintiffs were "inextricably linked" with the rights of the decedent
in the prior action.226 The court explained that the injury suffered
by a wrongful death plaintiff arises from the earlier injury to the
decedent. 227 The court cites only the outdated 228 Buckley rule that
contributory negligence of the decedent bars a claim by the heirs for
wrongful death to support the holding that the wrongful death action
is dependent upon the personal injury action. 229 The Evans court was
220. Secrest v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 60 Cal. App. 746, 749, 751, 141 P.2d 747, 748, 750
(1943).
221. See Secrest, 60 Cal. App. 2d 746, 141 P.2d 747. Secrest is not authority for the
assertion that the heirs of a personal injury plaintiff are in privity with that plaintiff. The
wrongful death plaintiff was a party to the personal injury action, so no privity was required
for collateral estoppel to bar relitigation. Privity was not an issue in Secrest. Id.
222. Evans, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
223. Id.
224. Id. (citing Zaragosa v. Cravert, 33 Cal. App. 2d 315, 318, 202 P.2d 73, 74-75 (1949)).
225. Evans, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261 (citing Clemmer v. Hartford
Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 875, 587 P.2d 1098, 1104, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285, 289 (1949).
226. Evans, 194 Cal. App. at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
227. Id.
228. The Buckley holding applies the law of contributory negligence to wrongful death
plaintiffs but contributory negligence has been overruled in California and therefore Buckley
is not the law in California. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 858 (1975).
229. Evans, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261, (citing Buckley v. Chadwick,
45 Cal. 2d 183, 288 P.2d 12 (1955)). The court relied on Buckley as authority for the assertion
that the rights of the heirs are dependent on the rights of the personal injury victim. Id.
Buckley held that the contributory negligence of the deceased is a complete bar to a wrongful
death suit. Buckley v. Chadwick, 45 Cal. 2d at 183, 201, 288 P.2d 12, 22 (1955). See Li, 13
Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (overruling contributory negligence).
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misguided in relying on Buckley since both contributory negligence
and the imputation of negligence have been abolished.20
The holding in Kaiser, that no privity exists between the personal
injury and wrongful death plaintiffs, will survive the modern privity
test. 2 31 The parties in the personal injury and wrongful death actions
have no legal interests in common because each action represents a
distinct and independent right. 2 Thus, the relationship between the
personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs is not sufficiently close
to justify the application of collateral estoppel. 233
Even if the heirs are found to be sufficiently close to the decedent,
due process requires that three criteria be met before a privity
relationship ex ists3 . 4 Since most California courts support the com-
plete independence of a wrongful death action, wrongful death
plaintiffs have no "identity or community of interest" with personal
injury plaintiffs. 23- Furthermore, since the wrongful death action is
independent, the plaintiff-heirs should not reasonably expect to be
bound by prior adjudication of the personal injury claim.236 The final
due process requirement of adequate representation by the personal
injury plaintiff must be decided on a case by case basis. 237 Adequate
representation alone will not suffice to invoke privity to collaterally
estop without also meeting the other requirements. 238 Therefore, the
But see Rovegno v. San Jose Knights of Columbus Ass'n, 108 Cal. App. 591, 291 P. 848
(1930) (implied assumption of the risk by decedent is not a bar).
230. See Buckley, 45 Cal. 3d at 199, 203-06, 288 P.2d at 21, 24-25; Li, 13 Cal. 3d 804,
532 P.2d 1226, 19 Cal. Rptr. 858 (overruling contributory negligence); Lantis v. Condon, 95
Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 (1975) (holding that imputation of negligence is abolished).
See also Willis v. Gordon, 20 Cal. 3d 629, 636, 574 P.2d 794, 798, 143 Cal. Rptr. 723, 729
(Mosk, J., concurring) Nourse, supra note 190, at 313 (questioning the logic of the imputation
of negligence in a wrongful death actions). See generally V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 183, §
13.3 n.22.
231. Evans, 194 Cal. App. 3d at 746, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
232. Compare Evans v. Celotex Corp., 194 Cal. App. 3d 741, 745-46, 238 Cal. Rptr. 259,
261 (1987) (requiring an identity or community of interest with and adequate representation
by the losing party and a reasonable expectation that the judgment against the losing partner
would bind a non-party) with Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327,
333, 62 Cal. Rptr. 330, 333 (1967) (no privity exists between the personal injury plaintiff and
the wrongful death plaintiff because there is no identity in the causes of action and the
wrongful death plaintiff is not a successor in interest).
233. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 872, 587 P.2d 1098, 1100, 151 Cal.
Rptr. 285, 287 (1979) (no privity relationship existed since the interests in the first action were
different than the interests of the wrongful death plaintiffs); See Kaiser, 254 Cal. App. 2d at
334, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 333, (holding there is no identity of interest).
234. See Clemmer, 22 Cal. 3d at 875, 587 P.2d at 1102-03, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 289-90




238. Id. (All three due process criteria must be met to establish a privity relationship).
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three due process requirements necessary to invoke privity between
wrongful death plaintiffs and personal injury plaintiffs are not sat-
isfied.2-9 Since no privity exists, an adverse personal injury judgment
should not bar a subsequent wrongful death action. 240
VII. PROPOSAL
The California Supreme Court should hold that the wrongful death
action is unaffected by an adverse personal injury judgment and
reject the view that the personal injury and Wrongful death actions
are linked.2 4' This holding would be consistent with the court's view
that the wrongful death cause of action is wholly independent. 242 The
court should expressly overrule Buckley and follow legal authority
interpreting the current wrongful death statute243 and the view that
statutory law abolishes imputed negligence. 244
Once Buckley is formally overruled, no basis exists for the holding
in Evans, that the personal injury and wrongful death claims are
interdependent..2 45 However, even without the specific overruling, the
Buckley rule is not pervasive enough to justify the view that the
California wrongful death action is dependent of the personal injury
action. 246 This view conflicts with the clear meaning of the wrongful
death statute and the predominant legal interpretation holding the
statute completely independent. Since Buckley is outdated and con-
flicts with the newest trend towards doing away with imputed neg-
ligence the Buckley rule is not good authority for finding privity
between the personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs. 247
CONCLUSION
Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an issue by the parties to
the prior action or people in privity with the parties. Personal injury
239. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
240. See Kaiser Found. Hosp. v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. App. 2d 327, 333, 62 Cal. Rptr.
330, 333 (1967).
241. See supra notes 198-240 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 119-166 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 226-229 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 167-191 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 119-166 and accompanying text.
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and wrongful death actions involve the same issues. Thus, collateral
estoppel bars the wrongful death plaintiffs from relitigating the issues
decided in a personal injury action, if the wrongful death plaintiffs
were parties to the personal injury action or in privity with the
personal injury plaintiffs. Privity connotes a relationship that is
sufficiently close to justify the application of collateral estoppel.
Additionally, a finding of privity is precluded if the due process
rights of the claimant were not adequately represented in the previous
cause of action. The determination of whether a privity relationship
exists turns on whether the wrongful death action is derivative, or
independent of the personal injury action.
In California, the wrongful death cause of action is independent
of the personal injury action at least to the extent that recovery by
the personal injury plaintiff-decedent does not bar the wrongful death
cause of action. This independence, additionally, prevents an implied
assumption of the risk and a prior express release of liability by the
decedent from affecting the wrongful death action. Since the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that the wrongful death statute is inde-
pendent, the heirs have no link to the personal injury action that is
sufficiently close to justify the application of collateral estoppel.
Furthermore, the rights of the heirs to recover damages for the death
of the decedent are not represented by the personal injury plaintiff.
Due process requires that the heirs be given an opportunity to directly
litigate the wrongful death claim. Consequently, if a personal injury
plaintiff brings an action and loses, the right of the heirs to bring a
cause of action should be completely unaffected.
Elizabeth A. West
